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Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 2586, 186 L. 




I.  ABSTRACT 
Koontz extends the application of Nollan and Dolan, which require exactions of real property 
for land-use permits to share a “nexus” and be “roughly proportional” to the regulation to be 
constitutional.  A divided United States Supreme Court held that “monetary exactions,” 
potentially including building permit fees or impact fees, must satisfy the Nollan and Dolan 
requirements even if the government denies the permit.  The Court did not reach the merits of the 
petitioner’s appeal.   
II.  INTRODUCTION 
The State of Florida has a statutory scheme to manage water and wetlands within the 
state.  The St. Johns River Water Management District (District) is one of several districts, which 
regulate development in Florida that impacts wetlands through regulations, by requiring permits 
for the dredge or fill of surface waters.  A Developer challenged the District’s tailored mitigation 
suggestions for his proposed development, which included a request to fund off-site mitigation 
work and to place the unused portion of his parcel in a conservation easement.2  The Developer 
believed the District’s suggested mitigation was “an unreasonable exercise of the state’s police 
power constituting a taking without just compensation,” for which Florida state law provides 
monetary damages.3  A divided Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that exactions, 
even if solely monetary, must be consistent with Nollan and Dolan.4   
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
                                                        
1(Kagan, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting). 
2
 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2592–2593 (2013). 
3Id. at 2589, 2594.  
4Id. at 2603. 
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In 1994, the Developer applied to the District for the necessary permits to commercially 
develop 3.7 acres of his 14.9 acre property.  In order to mitigate the development’s 
environmental impacts, the District suggested: a reduction in the size of the development to one 
acre, a deeded conservation easement on the remaining acreage in addition to what the 
Developer had offered, and a variety of specific drainage and retaining works on the property.  
Alternatively, the Developer could fund offsite mitigation work and develop the full 3.7 acres 
with a conservation easement dedication on the remaining acreage.5 
IV. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The lower court found that improvements and impacts created by an adjacent commercial 
development made the District’s suggested exactions a taking under Nollan and Dolan.  The 
appellate court affirmed, but Florida’s Supreme Court reversed.  The Florida Supreme Court’s 
holding was based on two independent grounds.  First, the Court concluded that a demand for 
money did not give rise to cause of action under either Nollan or Dolan, which had both involved 
a demand for an interest in real property.  Second, because the District had only suggested the 
mitigation and not denied the permit, the Court determined that a taking had yet to occur and the 
Developer’s cause of action was not ripe.6   
V. ANALYSIS 
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prevents the government from taking 
private property for public use without just compensation.7  Nollan and Dolan are specific 
takings protections pertinent to the unique nature of the land use permitting process.8  In Nollan 
and Dolan the Court noted that applicants for land-use permits are vulnerable to coercion—from 
                                                        
5Id. at 2593. 
6Id. at 2593-2594. 
7Id. at 2591.   
8Id. at 2594.   
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regulatory officials for demands for concessions (exactions) that “can pressure an owner into 
voluntarily giving up property for which the Fifth Amendment would otherwise require just 
compensation.”9  
Both cases evolved from the practice of conditioning building or development permit 
approval on the dedication of an easement.  Because the taking was cloaked in the land-use 
permit approval process, the demanded exaction was not readily apparent as a per se taking that 
would demand compensation under the Fifth Amendment.10  The resulting vulnerability of land-
use permit applicants, led the Court to hold that an illegal taking would occur if the demanded 
exaction did not share a “nexus and rough proportionality between the property that the 
government demands and the social costs of the applicant's proposal.”11   
Auxiliary to the Nollan and Dolan protections, the Court set forth standards in Penn 
Central Transp. Co. v. New York City defining when governmental regulations constitute a 
taking.12  The Penn Central framework had, until Koontz, potentially provided protections from 
excessive government regulations or monetary exactions.  Koontz directs that “when the 
government commands the relinquishment of funds linked to a specific, identifiable property 
interest such as a bank account or parcel of real property” that a per se taking has occurred.13     
Against the Penn Central, and Nollan and Dolan frameworks, Koontz represents a new 
protection from governmental actions that relate to land use.  Koontz holds that “government's 
demand for property from a land-use permit applicant must satisfy the requirements of Nollan 
                                                        
9Id. at 2594 (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 384, 377 (1994); Nollan v. California Coastal Com’n, 483 
U.S. 825, 831 (1987)).  
10Koontz, 133 S.Ct. at 2605. 
11Id. at 2595.   
12Id.at 2604 (“Under Penn Central, courts examine a regulation's ‘character’ and ‘economic impact,’ asking whether 
the action goes beyond “adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good” and 
whether it “interfere[s] with distinct investment-backed expectations.” Citing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York 
City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (2005).) 
13Koontz, 133 S.Ct. at 2600.   
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and Dolan even when the government denies the permit and even when its demand is for 
money.”14  Justice Kagan, in her dissent, characterizes the Koontz holding as both an expansion 
of what constitutes a taking and an expansion of those regulatory actions that are now subject to 
a Nollan and Dolan analysis.15   
The Court’s expansion of Nollan and Dolan to monetary exactions is rooted in an effort 
to close a perceived loophole: allowing local governments to evade Nollan and Dolan by 
offering “in lieu of” fees.  Since these fees provide the developer with one permit alternative that 
does not invoke Nollan or Dolan (monetary exactions), in the majority’s view, local 
governments have been able to evade Nollan and Dolan.16   
The Court also supports its reasoning by classifying monetary exactions as a potential 
taking instead of a regulation subject to Penn Central’s protections.  The Court previously held, 
outside the land use context, that the “relinquishment of funds linked to a specific, identifiable 
property interest such as a bank account or parcel or real property” is a per se taking.17  
Therefore, a monetary exaction related to land use can be classified as a per se taking, and not a 
regulation, and the Nollan and Dolan protections should apply—instead of Penn Central.   
The majority appears to disagree that its holding is so expansive, but the decision 
establishes no clear limit of its application.  There are two primary bases for expansion.  First, 
the Court does not define which governmental actions are “land use” and which are not.  Second, 
there is no guidance to differentiate between a demand for money and a regulatory tax.18  
Both the majority and the dissent agree that the Nollan and Dolan apply regardless if the 
government’s property exaction is a rejection, approval, or conditional approval of a permit 
                                                        
14Id. at 2603.  
15Id. at 2606–2607 (Kagan, J., dissenting)  
16Id. at 2599 (majority).  
17Koontz, 133 S.Ct. at 2601 (citing Brown v. Legal Foundation of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 235 (2003)). 
18Koontz, 133 S.Ct. at 2601.   
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application.19  This is a unanimous reversal of the Florida Supreme Court’s holding that a 
condition precedent for the filing of permit application was not subject to Nollan and Dolan, 
regardless of its substance. That holding appeared to require that the government actually took 
property, and not just imposed conditions precedent or subsequent that resulted in an exaction.20     
The controversy in Koontz dealt only with suggestions and proposals between the 
developer and the District.  The decision could cultivate fertile ground to expand when a 
governmental taking has occurred in contexts outside the land use process, depending on the 
remedies available in state law.21  
                                                        
19Id. at 2596 (“Our unconstitutional conditions cases have long refused to attach significance to the distinction 
between conditions precedent and conditions subsequent.”) Id. at 2603 (Kagan, J., dissenting).   
20Id. at 2595-2596.   
21Id. at 2597 (majority) (“While the unconstitutional conditions doctrine recognizes that this burdens a constitutional 
right, the Fifth Amendment mandates a particular remedy—just compensation—only for takings.”) 
